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Abstract 
In many countries environmental policies and regulations are implemented to improve 
environmental quality and thus individuals’ well-being. However, how do individuals value 
the environment? In this paper, we review the Life Satisfaction Approach (LSA) representing 
a new non-market valuation technique. The LSA builds on the recent development of 
subjective well-being research in economics and takes measures of reported life satisfaction 
as an empirical approximation to individual welfare. Micro-econometric life satisfaction 
functions are estimated taking into account environmental conditions along with income and 
other covariates. The estimated coefficients for the environmental good and income can then 
be used to calculate the implicit willingness-to-pay for the environmental good. 
JEL: Q51, I31, D61, Q53 
Keywords: life satisfaction approach, subjective well-being, non-market valuation, cost-
benefit analysis, air pollution 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental quality is an important determinant of individuals’ well-being and an 
important policy issue. In response to poor environmental conditions, in many countries 
environmental policies and regulations are implemented to improve them. However, how do 
individuals value the effects on the environment? 
In this paper, we review the Life Satisfaction Approach (LSA) representing a new non-
market valuation technique. The LSA builds on the recent development of subjective well-
being research in economics. A common understanding in this field is that subjective well-
being can serve as an empirical approximation to individual welfare. If this interpretation of 
subjective well-being measures is accepted, it becomes straightforward to value 
environmental goods: Environmental conditions can be taken into account in micro-
econometric life satisfaction functions along with income and other covariates. The estimated 
coefficient for the environmental good offers, first, a direct valuation in terms of subjective 
well-being. Second, the estimated coefficients for the environmental good and income can be 
used to calculate the implicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the environmental good or 
constant trade-off ratios between the environmental good and income. In other words, the 
increase in income can be calculated that would be necessary to compensate an individual for 
a given decrement in environmental conditions. 
This newly emerged approach stands in a long tradition and debate of research trying to 
measure individual welfare. Classical economists such as Bentham and Edgeworth believed 
that measurement of utility is not only possible but also that it could be used to improve the 
rationality of policy decisions. In contrast, today’s mainstream economics completely 
abandoned this idea. Preferences are inferred from behavior, above all, from market behavior. 
This poses obvious problems for environmental goods and other public goods for which no 
markets exist and for which individuals have limited incentive to disclose their true demand. 
Therefore, for a long time, economists have been very pessimistic as to whether it is possible 
to assess people’s preferences for public goods: “[T]he very essence of the public goods 
problem is that there is no way these preferences can be determined” (Due and Friedlaender 
1973, p. 53). 
In defiance of this negative view, economists developed ingenious ways to value 
environmental and other public goods. Essentially, two avenues have been pursued: Either 
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people are asked to state their preferences in hypothetical contingent markets or the 
preferences are inferred from behavior as they are revealed in markets for private goods that 
are complements or substitutes of the environmental good. Stated preference methods such as 
the contingent valuation method (CVM) and revealed preference methods such as the hedonic 
method (HM) have been widely used in practice, both in the regulatory process and in 
litigation (Palmquist and Smith 2002; Carson et al. 2003). However, these methods suffer 
from well-known problems. The hypothetical nature of CVM surveys is likely to entail 
superficial answers and strategic behavior. The HM, on the other hand, yields biased results if 
housing markets are not in equilibrium because, for example, people are not fully informed or 
mobility is not costless. 
The LSA aims at obviating several of these problems inherent in the standard methods or at 
least at offering a complementary approach. Importantly, the approach does not rely on an 
equilibrium assumption. Further, individuals are not asked to value the environmental good 
directly, but to evaluate their general life satisfaction. This is presumably a cognitively less 
demanding task and there is no reason to expect strategic behavior. While the LSA avoids 
some of the difficulties with previous valuation approaches, it depends on its own 
preconditions for a successful application. In particular, the validity of measures of subjective 
well-being, their inclusiveness and their reference to the present situation are important. 
Moreover, reports of life satisfaction should have small measurement errors, be 
interpersonally comparable and be available at a sufficiently large scale (at a sufficiently low 
cost). 
The remainder of this review is organized in four sections. Section 2 introduces the basics of 
the LSA. Section 3 compares the LSA to the most prominent standard non-market valuation 
methods, the CVM and the HM. Section 4 provides a review of applications of the LSA. The 
focus is on studies valuing air quality. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. The Basic Concept 
The measurement of individual welfare, using data on reported subjective well-being, has 
made great progress and lead to a new field of subjective well-being research in economics.1 
                                                             
1 For surveys on the study of subjective well-being in economics, see Frey and Stutzer (2002b; a), 
Layard (2005), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Clark et al. (2008) and van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2008). 
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The LSA rests upon this new field of research and starts to build an important pillar of its 
fruitful policy relevant application.2 
First, we discuss measures of subjective well-being as an approximation of individual 
welfare. Second, the valuation procedure as proposed by the LSA is outlined. In a third 
subsection, the prerequisites for a successful application of the approach are explained. 
Measuring individual welfare 
In received economics, utility is what is maximized in consistent choice, a representation of 
preferences which are simply choice-connected rankings of outcomes. According to the 
axiomatic approach, individuals’ choices provide all the information required to infer the 
utility of outcomes. Subjectivist experience captured by surveys is rejected as being not 
objectively observable and unscientific. However, this position restricts the questions that can 
be addressed. Most importantly, conceptions about individuals’ preferences or utility 
functions remain vague and the valuation of public goods is hampered. Revealed preference 
methods cannot be applied in all cases of interest and non-use values leave no behavioral 
trace. It is, therefore, no coincidence that non-market valuation is a field in economics where 
surveys have been widely used. 
In recent economic research, new ways are proved to approach individual welfare. Utility is 
again related to the original, Benthamite meaning of utility as the hedonic quality of 
experience, broadly construed to include satisfaction as well as pleasure. In many situations 
the choice-based and the experience-based concept of utility coincide but there is also 
evidence indicating that they may systematically diverge in some situations (Kahneman et al. 
1997). Empirically, utility based on judgments of satisfaction and pleasure can be captured by 
measures of subjective well-being.3 
Subjective well-being is the umbrella term for different measures that can be distinguished 
along two dimensions. Regarding the first dimension, a common distinction is between 
cognition, the cognitive, evaluative or judgmental component of well-being (usually assessed 
                                                             
2 For a general discussion on the use of research on subjective well-being in public policy see Adler 
and Posner (2008) and Frey and Stutzer (2010). 
3 The empirical study of subjective well-being used to be the province of hedonic psychology (for 
reviews, see Diener et al. 1999; Kahneman et al. 1999a). 
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with life satisfaction), and affect, the pleasure-pain component of well-being (Diener 1984). 
With regard to affect, two independent components of positive and negative affect are 
differentiated. The discriminant validity of the three components is analyzed in Arthaud-Day 
et al. (2005). The second dimension distinguishes between measures that capture a person’s 
level of subjective well-being and the duration in the one rather than another mental state. 
Because life satisfaction is a relatively stable construct, duration measures usually refer to 
affect. A primary example of a duration measure is the U-index which measures the 
proportion of time an individual spends in an unpleasant state. Thus, the combination of the 
dimensions entails four typical measures: the level of life satisfaction, the level of positive 
affect, the level of negative affect (or the difference between the two affective levels) and the 
duration in one affective state. 
The measures are elicited with global self-reports in surveys, the Experience Sampling 
Method (ESM), which collects information on individuals’ actual experiences in real time in 
their natural environments, and the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM), which asks people to 
reflect on how satisfied they felt at various times during the day (on the latter two techniques, 
see Stone et al. 1999; Kahneman et al. 2004). Measures and measurement techniques are not 
independent of each other. For example, measures with an inherent time component are best 
captured by the ESM or DRM. Further, neurophysological correlates of subjective well-being 
have been found with electro-encephalography (EEG) and neuroimaging techniques (Urry et 
al. 2004). On the one hand, these correlates validate survey measures; on the other hand they 
can be used as independent measures of subjective well-being. 
The various measures capture different aspects of individual well-being and thus different 
concepts of individual welfare. For a measure of reported subjective well-being to serve as a 
proxy for individual welfare, an important assumption is necessary: The standards underlying 
people’s judgments are those the individual would like to pursue in realizing his or her ideal 
of the good life. People’s judgments about their life can then serve as a proxy for their 
individual welfare. People are assumed to pursue individual welfare based on some stable 
evaluation standards. Moreover, the extent to which individual welfare is identified depends 
on whether the evaluation metric fits people’s judgments about their life. 
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The normative basis of this approach goes beyond assuming the pursuit of happiness, and 
also involves choosing the concrete evaluation metric to elicit people’s judgments.4 Thus, 
ambiguities remain when selecting the empirical concept in order to measure individual 
welfare. 
Some people might favor a distant look reflecting on one’s life after the fact, while others 
favor the reasoned ex ante evaluations as their standards. Still others might give priority to 
how they felt when experiencing the course of life. 
Imagine those people who see high individual welfare as something like the “positive, 
persistent attitude towards both particular experiences and life experience more generally that 
a person feels upon repeated reflection” (Kelman 2005, pp. 408-409). For them, general 
evaluations of their satisfaction with life as a whole might be an appropriate metric to capture 
judgments about individual welfare. For those people who equate individual welfare with 
moment-to-moment affect, individual welfare might be best measured by such approaches as 
the ESM or the DRM. When looking for an empirical tool to collect information about 
people’s judgments, it is thus important to reveal the concrete metric. 
Most of the empirical work undertaken so far on subjective well-being research in economics 
has been based on representative, large-scale sampling of individual global evaluations of life 
satisfaction. Given the state of research, we favor these measures of life satisfaction to value 
people’s living conditions (and this also explains the name of the approach) as they offer a 
blend of cognitive judgment and affective state. Moreover, this kind of “affect-contaminated” 
cognition corresponds to what has been considered the best theory on the nature of welfare in 
philosophy (Sumner 1996, pp. 140-156). 
The valuation procedure 
Granted that reported subjective well-being can serve as an empirically adequate and valid 
approximation for individual welfare, it is an obvious and straightforward strategy to directly 
evaluate public goods in welfare terms. Moreover, by measuring the marginal utility of a 
public good or the marginal disutility of a public bad, as well as the marginal utility of 
income, the trade-off ratio between income and the public good can be calculated. 
                                                             
4 An excellent account of the ambiguities of welfare in the context of economics and hedonic 
psychology is provided in Kelman (2005). 
  7 
The respective relationship can be stated in a simple subjective well-being function: 
 SWB = f(x, y, θ'z) 1. 
Individual welfare in terms of subjective well-being depends on some good x, i.e. the 
environmental condition to be valued, income y and a set θ'z of other individual-level and 
macro-level determinants of subjective well-being. 
Roughly speaking, a change in the non-market good of Δx is valued by Δy (corresponding to 
an implicit WTP) if this holds individual well-being constant. For a marginal change of x, the 
marginal WTP (MWTP) can be derived from totally differentiating function (1) and setting 
dSWB=0: 
 MWTP = -dy/dx = (δf/δx)/(δf/δy) 2. 
MWTP is invariant to any monotonic transformation of the subjective well-being function, 
i.e. no cardinal utility function is required. 
For the valuation of infra-marginal changes of non-market good x two measures exist: First, 
the compensating variation is the amount of income necessary to keep the individual at the 
original or ex ante level of subjective well-being when a change in environmental conditions 
occurred. Second, the equivalent variation is the change in income necessary to attain the 
level of subjective well-being as if a change in environmental conditions occurred, i.e. the ex 
post level for a hypothetical change in environmental quality. 
In order to calculate the relevant welfare measures, a subjective well-being function such as 
(1) can be estimated as an ordered discrete choice model applying ordered logit or ordered 
probit regressions. While the estimated coefficients from these models have no meaningful 
interpretation (as they refer to an underlying latent variable), ratios between any two 
coefficients can be interpreted. Therefore, the coefficients for the non-market good x and 
income y can be employed to calculate the marginal rate of substitution or the MWTP and 
welfare measures for infra-marginal changes. Thus, it is not necessary to assume cardinality. 
For applications with individual panel data, OLS estimations are attractive that allow to 
control for individual-fixed effects. There is some evidence that assuming cardinality and 
using OLS makes little difference to estimating ratios between coefficients (while taking into 
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account individual heterogeneity makes a large difference) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
2004). 
A common specification of an empirical subjective well-being function is the following: 
 LSi,j,t = β0 + β1xj,t + β2log(yi,t) + β'zi,j,t + ρj + τt + ιi + εi,j,t. 3. 
In this specification, LSi,j,t stands for reported life satisfaction as a specific measure of 
subjective well-being of individual i in location j in time t. Specification (3) is a linearized 
version of equation (1) up to the log of income term ln(yi,t). A log of income specification 
presumes that the monetary value of change in environmental conditions is measured as a 
fraction of an individual’s income. This implies that people with a higher income are 
prepared to give up more income in absolute terms for some improvement in environmental 
quality. This is equivalent to imposing decreasing marginal utility of income. Vector z again 
captures other individual-level and macro-level determinants. Finally, ρi is a set of region or 
location-fixed effects taking into account unobserved time-invariant factors, τt a set of time-
fixed effects capturing unobserved location-invariant factors, ιi are individual-fixed effects 
and εi,j,t an error term. 
So far, the LSA is presented without any interaction between the quality of the environment 
and other determinants of subjective well-being that are taken into account in the empirical 
analysis. In particular, market forces are expected to lead to upward wage pressure and a 
downward pressure on rents for housing in locations where the environmental quality is bad. 
These are the two most fundamental channels through which people are compensated for 
adverse environmental conditions. Accordingly, equation (1) would need to be extended to 
include income as a function of x, i.e., y(x), and rents as one of many other factors in z to 
depend on x, i.e., z(x). Obviously the aspect of (partial) compensation is relevant for the 
interpretation of measured partial correlations between environmental conditions and 
subjective well-being. We discuss this aspect in Section 4 after an exposition of HM which 
values non-market goods under the presumption of compensation of amenities and 
disamenities on the market. We emphasize the links between LSA and HM and outline under 
what conditions they can serve as complementary approaches. 
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There are, of course, the standard identification issues in empirical analyses that also apply to 
the LSA. We do not discuss them here in abstract but in relation to specific applications in 
Section 5. 
Premises for the application of the LSA 
The different measurement techniques and their corresponding measures all have their 
strengths and weaknesses. Which measure and measurement technique is to be preferred 
depends ultimately on its intended use. In the following, we list six premises that are relevant 
for the evaluation of public goods. The measures of subjective well-being should (i) be valid 
measures of individual welfare, (ii) be broad and inclusive, (iii) refer to respondents’ present 
situation, (iv) have small measurement errors, and no systematic ones (v) be interpersonally 
comparable, and (vi) be available at a sufficiently large scale (at a sufficiently low cost). 
Validity. While we claimed the validity of subjective well-being measures at the outset of this 
review, we present here some specific evidence for reported satisfaction with life. 
Respondents who are satisfied with their lives are also rated as satisfied by family members, 
friends and experts (Sandvik et al. 1993). Life satisfaction scores correlate with other 
variables that can be plausibly claimed to be associated with true individual well-being (Di 
Tella and MacCulloch 2006). In two 20-year follow-up studies, low levels of reported life 
satisfaction predicted all-cause, disease and injury mortality, especially for male respondents 
(Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2000) and suicide (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2001). Satisfied 
individuals are less likely to suffer from hypertension, a relationship that even translates into 
a correlation between hypertension and satisfaction at the national level (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 2007). Finally, life satisfaction predicts both, future marriage (Stutzer and Frey 2006) 
and future marital break-up (Gardner and Oswald 2006). 
Inclusiveness. Essentially, this criterion approaches the validity issue from a second angle. 
Subjective well-being is an appropriate empirical approximation of individual welfare if it is 
broad and all inclusive. We think that the current evidence supports this position. However, 
critics claim that subjective well-being is extremely narrow and constitutes only one of many 
components of individual welfare (Adler and Posner 2006, p. 77), one sub-utility function 
among others (Kimball and Willis 2006). This debate parallels the normative question of the 
nature of welfare with the “objectivist” ascribing various goods intrinsic importance and 
“subjectivists” conceding other goods only instrumental importance insofar as they contribute 
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to well-being. The positive question asks whether other “higher order” goods are sub-utility 
functions of equal standing with subjective well-being or whether these goods are arguments 
in the subjective well-being function with no independent effect on individual utility. Data on 
subjective well-being can only be used to evaluate policies if subjective well-being is a broad 
and (all-)inclusive concept. 
The strategy of the critics is to equate subjective well-being with pleasure and pain and 
declare the ESM or DRM as the gold standard of measurement techniques. They then reject 
the view that subjective well-being thus understood is a meaningful measure of overall utility 
and extend the conclusions beyond the narrower measures to subjective well-being research 
as such. This victory over measures of subjective well-being is cheap and hollow. As we have 
mentioned, there is a wide array of measures and measurement techniques. 
Reference to presence. Measures of subjective well-being should refer to the respondents’ 
present lives and represent their period- or flow-utility. If scores of subjective well-being 
reflected discounted expected future utility, it would become difficult to relate changes in 
objective circumstances to changes in subjective well-being. In measures of global self-
reports, the focus on the present situation is often indicated by means of the wording of the 
question. Often the questions have extensions such as “these days”, “now”, “nowadays” or 
“at present”. 
Measurement errors. The major concern in the discussion on the degree of inclusiveness was 
that measures of subjective well-being may exclude important aspects of utility. The converse 
concern is that measures of subjective well-being include a lot of noise and are contaminated 
by confounding factors. Most research on this problem has focused on global self-reports. 
Normally, the global judgments are only construed when asked. Answering the question 
involves cognitive (memory and aggregation) and communicative processes. At the level of 
the cognitive processes, concerns may arise that respondents may make little mental effort 
and instead rely on easily accessible information. Experimental research shows that self-
reports can be influenced by the immediate context as well as by artificially induced intra- 
and interpersonal comparisons and temporal mood states (Schwarz and Strack 1991). At the 
level of the communicative process, issues of communicative norms, self-representation and 
social desirability become important (Larsen and Frederickson 1999; Schwarz and Strack 
1999). 
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In order to assess the importance of these findings for the LSA, it is useful to integrate them 
into a measurement error framework (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). This allows us to 
distinguish two types of errors: White noise errors that are unrelated to right hand side 
variables on the one hand, and systematic errors that are correlated with the explanatory 
variables on the other hand. Mood variability and most context effects fall in the first 
category. Conceptually, errors of this sort pose no problem. They entail no systematic bias as 
the idiosyncratic effects cancel each other out. However, the random variation reduces the 
statistical fit. Therefore, the ratio of error variance to true variance has to be sufficiently low 
to make statistical work productive. 
Measurement errors that fall into the second category pose a more serious problem. Two 
findings of the experimental research are of potential relevance for the LSA. First, other 
questions in the questionnaire and the order of the question can influence the reported 
subjective well-being. If the questionnaire includes questions referring to the public good to 
be evaluated and to income, these questions may systematically bias the results, especially if 
the questions precede the subjective well-being question. On the one hand, the questions 
increase the accessibility of information on the public good and income and heighten their 
awareness, thereby increasing the weight of these aspects in the global judgment. On the 
other hand, conversational norms of non-redundancy may decrease the weight of these 
aspects. The latter effect is to be expected if questions of satisfaction with the public good or 
satisfaction with income immediately precede the subjective well-being question. Both 
effects have been documented (Strack et al. 1988). Second, answers deemed to be socially 
desirable or serving self-representation purposes can also systematically influence the results. 
Thus, problems of the second category have important implications for the questionnaire 
design and survey mode as well as for the choice of existing data. 
Interpersonal comparability. No doubt, it is in principle not possible to observe the level of 
an individual’s utility and, therefore, compare utility levels of different persons (Robbins 
1938). Individuals with identical preferences (as revealed through behavior) and with 
identical expressive reactions to any situation may nevertheless attach different utilities to 
identical situations. In the present context, the practical question thus are whether identical 
(verbal and physiological) expressions reflect similar mental states and what the 
consequences for empirical research are if they do not. 
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Kahneman (2000) suggests that there is evidence of considerable interpersonal convergence 
in ranking of pleasure and pain. In painful medical procedures, for example, the relationship 
between expressed pain and physiological reactions is similar across persons. Similarly, the 
correlations between self- and other-reports discussed above show that self-reports are not 
just artifacts of individual specific response behavior but are related to shared standards of 
evaluation. More importantly, for most empirical research (including research using the 
LSA), comparisons at the individual level are not necessary. Instead, empirical analysis is 
focusing on groups and compares the subjective well-being of individuals under different 
circumstances, e.g. the subjective well-being of groups of individuals exposed to different 
levels of a public good. By focusing on groups, personal peculiarities of individuals 
counterbalance one another. 
In sum, Robbins’ (1938) statement that utility cannot be interpersonally compared with 
standard scientific rigor still holds and pertains to all measures of subjective well-being. 
However, it is important to remember that without the assumption of interpersonal 
comparability of utility, cost benefit analyses and many other analyses in applied welfare 
economics are impossible. 
Availability and costs. Most public goods can be expected to have relatively small effects on 
subjective well-being, in particular, smaller effects than personal characteristics. In order to 
statistically detect the effects, large sample sizes are required. Therefore, the cost component 
is another criterion for evaluating measures and measurement techniques. Beyond doubt, the 
least expensive measurement technique are surveys including global self-reports. The most 
expensive measurement techniques are probably the ESM and physiological techniques, the 
DRM falling between these two extremes. 
4. Comparison with Standard Methods 
In economics, environmental valuation is typically based on preferences stated in 
hypothetical contingent markets or on preferences revealed in the demand for marketed goods 
(e.g., Freeman 2003). In the following, we discuss the two most prominent methods – the 
CVM and the HM – and their inherent problems, in particular those which the life satisfaction 
obviates. 
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Stated preference methods: Contingent valuation (CVM) 
The CVM is a survey based technique of non-market valuation. Respondents are asked 
directly what they would be willing to pay for a change in an environmental amenity. This is 
often an unfamiliar situation and gives rise to problems of strategic responses. Therefore, the 
credibility, validity and reliability of results based on the CVM are the subject of heated 
controversy in economics. Skepticism is largely based on the empirically observed 
“embedding effect” (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) that refers to several interrelated 
regularities in CVM surveys, i.e. the insensitivity of expressed WTP to scale and scope of the 
public good, as well as sequencing and sub-additivity effects. Critics see the “embedding 
effect” as evidence for the non-existence of individual preferences for the public good; 
individuals receive positive feelings from expressing support for good causes and, 
accordingly, the survey process creates the values it seeks to reveal (Diamond and Hausman 
1994). However, meta-analysis find significant sensitivity to scale and scope (Smith and 
Osborne 1996) and, according to proponents, the sequencing and the sub-additivity effect can 
be explained in terms of substitution effects and diminishing marginal rates of substitution 
(Hanemann 1994; Carson et al. 2001). Further, a number of guidelines have been developed 
to assure credibility, validity and reliability, most importantly the presentation of adequate 
information, the choice of a credible (hypothetical) method of public good provision and 
payment mechanism and the use of the referendum format (Arrow et al. 1993; Portney 1994). 
Nevertheless, the two basic problems of the CVM are difficult to overcome. The hypothetical 
nature of the questions asked and the unfamiliarity of the task often entail superficial answers 
and symbolic valuation in the form of attitude expression (Kahneman et al. 1999b). Similarly, 
the problem of strategic behavior can only be addressed to a limited extent. The LSA is not 
affected by either of these problems. It does not rely on respondents’ ability to consider all 
relevant consequences of a change in the provision of a public good. In fact, people might not 
even consciously notice that there is a relationship between environmental conditions like 
fine particulate matter in an urban region and their subjective well-being. It suffices if they 
state their own life satisfaction with some degree of precision. This considerably reduces 
subjects’ cognitive burden and costs of information processing. Moreover, there is no reason 
to expect strategic behavior because the connection between life satisfaction and the 
environmental good is made ex post by the researcher. One might argue that a respondent 
exposed to a negative externality, anticipating that his or her reported life satisfaction is used 
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to value the externality, strategically reports an overly low life satisfaction. While 
theoretically possible, this problem is most likely to be of minor importance in practice. Life 
satisfaction data are usually collected for a multitude of purposes and the same data can be 
used to value a wide array of (environmental) goods. This effectively prevents strategic 
biases. 
Revealed preference methods: Hedonic method (HM) 
The HM invokes the assumption of weak complementarity between an environmental good 
and a private good such as housing and can be used if the former is a qualitative characteristic 
of the latter. In such a situation, the housing market functions as a market for the 
environmental good and information on environmental good demand is embedded in the 
prices and consumption level of housing. House price differentials between locations with 
different environmental conditions serve as implicit prices for the environmental good. In 
equilibrium they correspond to the individuals’ MWTP for the environmental good (Rosen 
1974; Roback 1982). 
The main problems of the HM arise from its dependence on the equilibrium assumption. This 
assumption is only met if there is a sufficiently wide variety of houses, if prices adjust 
rapidly, if households have full information and if transaction and moving costs are zero. 
These conditions are often violated and, consequently, WTP estimates biased. For example, if 
mobility is costly, the true value of a change in an environmental amenity is greater than the 
house price effects imply. Consider the case of an exogenous improvement in air quality in a 
particular region. The cleaner air attracts new residents and, as a consequence, costs of 
housing rise until a new equilibrium is reached. Without mobility costs, the change in the 
costs of housing fully reflects the value of cleaner air. However, if migration is costly, a 
person will only move to the region with improved air quality if the cleaner air compensates 
him or her for both the higher rents and the cost of moving. In order to estimate the full WTP 
in presence of migration costs, Bayer et al. (2009) develop an alternative discrete choice 
approach that models household decision directly and does not rely on the equilibrium 
condition. They use their approach to value air quality (total suspended particulate, TSP) in 
the U.S. metropolitan areas in 1990 and 2000. The estimated annual MWTP for the median 
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household income amounts to between $309 and $384 (in 2007 U.S. dollars).5 By 
comparison, the MWTP estimated with the conventional hedonic model is only $114. Their 
results suggest, thus, that conventional hedonic models underestimate the WTP for clean air 
by a factor of around three. In contrast to the hedonic method, the LSA explicitly captures 
individual welfare in the absence of market equilibria. In the case of public goods for which it 
is useful to distinguish between expected benefits and materialized benefits and for which the 
effects on life satisfaction are identified on the basis of the latter, the LSA can recover the full 
utility consequences independent of the degree of capitalization in the housing and labor 
market. For all other public goods, compensating variation in the private markets has to be 
accounted for. If they are not, the LSA captures only the residual effect. These issues are 
discussed in more detail below. Anticipating one of the main conclusions, the discussion 
suggests that, if anything, the LSA works best if there is no market equilibrium. 
As with mobility costs, incomplete information of households is likely to bias the hedonic 
estimates downwards. To correctly anticipate the effect of an environmental disamenity such 
as air pollution at a particular location, a prospective house buyer or renter requires adequate 
knowledge of pollution risks and adequate information about prevailing pollution levels. 
Distorted risk perceptions may bias hedonic estimates in either direction since people may 
underestimate or exaggerate the risk of pollution.6 In contrast, incomplete information about 
prevailing pollution levels invariably attenuates price gradients towards zero (Pope 2008b). 
Several studies suggest that individuals’ information void on location specific amenity levels 
and the resulting downward bias in hedonic estimates may be large. Brookshire et al. (1985) 
and Troy and Romm (2004) find no price discounts for properties in areas with elevated risks 
of earthquakes and flooding before laws have been passed that require sellers of property to 
disclose information on earthquake and flood risks, but large and significant price discounts 
thereafter. Similarly, Pope (2008a) finds the introduction of mandatory disclosure 
requirements to increase the marginal valuation of airport noise by 37%. 
Distorted perceptions are of particular importance for the capitalization of health effects. 
Smith and Huang (1995) provide evidence consistent with the notion of incomplete 
                                                             
5 Bayer et al. (2009) report their results in 1982-1984 U.S. dollars. The figures have been transformed 
to 2007 U.S. dollars using the CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
6 For example, McCluskey and Rausser (2001) show that risk perceptions and consequently hedonic 
price gradients are importantly influenced by newspaper coverage. 
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capitalization of health effects. Benefit estimates for improvements in air quality in selected 
US cities based on dose-response functions and value of statistical life estimates are at least 
four times higher than benefit estimates based on hedonic studies. Smith and Huang (1995, p. 
223) conclude that “hedonic models are more likely to reflect aesthetics, materials and soiling 
effects, and, to some degree, perceived health effects, but the latter may well be incomplete.” 
Moreover, reduced mortality risk is only one benefit of clean air. Reduced risk of morbidity, 
both chronic diseases and minor symptomatic discomforts, reduced material damages and 
improved visibility are other benefits. 
A conceptual problem of revealed preference methods is that individuals’ behavior in private 
markets always reflects expected future risks (even if expectations are based on current or 
past risks). In contrast, in most applications of the LSA, the welfare consequences of risks are 
primarily identified on the basis of actual events, i.e. when the risk materializes. The LSA is, 
therefore, less affected by distorted risk perceptions. As mentioned above, the LSA can also 
capture effects of externalities that affect individuals’ life satisfaction through a process 
unnoticed by the individuals themselves. For example, it can capture the welfare 
consequences of health effects even if individuals are ignorant about the causes. Moreover, 
most survey respondents are long-term residents in a particular location and they are arguably 
better informed about prevailing pollution levels than prospective house buyers and renters 
who consider moving to that location. This is not to say that perceptions are irrelevant for the 
LSA. To the extent that perceptions of local pollution levels as such enter individual welfare 
judgments, distorted risk perceptions affect life satisfaction estimates as well. However, the 
above discussion suggests that distorted perceptions are more important for the hedonic 
method than for the LSA. 
Utility misprediction and valuation 
The standard methods are also challenged by the systematic divergence of two basic concepts 
of utility. The traditional axiomatic approach in economics holds that the choices made by 
individuals provide all the information required to infer the utility of outcomes. People, on 
average, correctly predict how they value some outcome. This first concept of utility is the 
basis for the revealed preference methods for valuing the environment. The same 
presumption with regard to the accurate prediction of utility is also underlying stated 
preference methods. There is now more and more evidence in both, hypothetical and real 
markets, that individuals mispredict their future feelings (Kahneman and Thaler 2006; Frey 
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and Stutzer 2008). This undermines a tenet of the revealed preference approach. Utility 
misprediction is due to a combination of incorrect intuitive theories about the determinants of 
happiness, incorrect believes regarding the speed and degree of adaptation, a difference in 
saliency of various aspects between the moment of prediction and the moment of experience 
and a focusing illusion (for a discussion of these effects in the specific context of the CVM, 
see Loewenstein and Schkade 1999; Kahneman and Sugden 2005; Dolan and Kahneman 
2008). Moreover, these deviations and discrepancies are most likely in complex decisions 
with long-term trade-offs (Camerer et al. 2005), i.e. nearly all decisions of policy relevance. 
Therefore, the second utility concept underlying the LSA emphasizes individuals’ judgments 
of experiences ex post as for example reflected in measures of reported life satisfaction. With 
this concept, valuation of alternatives are expected to be less biased by systematic prediction 
errors. 
Relationship between the HM and LSA 
There is some disagreement in the literature about the relationship between the HM and the 
LSA and about what effects of environmental quality can be identified with the LSA. While 
some compare estimates based on the HM with estimates based on the LSA and, thus, 
implicitly or explicitly see the two methods as substitutes that measure the same thing (e.g., 
Dolan and Metcalfe 2008), others argue that the methods are complementary and the 
estimates from the two methods have to be combined (van Praag, Bernard M. S. and Baarsma 
2005; Luechinger 2009b). The intuitive explanation underlying the second position is that – 
according to the premise of the hedonic method – people exposed to negative externalities are 
compensated in the housing market. The markets compensate people for the costs of self-
protection measures, for the costs of locally financed public measures as well as for any 
direct utility costs associated with these measures, for higher risk premiums for insuring 
themselves against damages as well as for all non-insurable and non-avertable losses. 
Therefore, this compensating variation has a countervailing effect on individual welfare. In 
the market equilibrium, rents must adjust to equalize utility across locations. Otherwise, some 
individuals would have an incentive to move (Roback 1982). If the equilibrium assumption 
holds and people are fully compensated, we would find no effect of an environmental 
disamenity on life satisfaction in a life satisfaction regression with the environmental 
disamenity as an explanatory variable. However, as discussed above, migration costs and 
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informational asymmetries may prevent full capitalization in particular in the short run. It is 
these residual shadow costs of environmental conditions that are captured with the LSA. 
So far, the discussion refers to cross-section analyses but the same argument can be made for 
panel analyses.7 Utility will be equalized across regions at every point in time but not 
necessarily across time. However, changes over time will usually be captured by time 
specific effects. Thus, also with panel data, only the residual effect can be captured. Of 
course, in a panel setting, the focus is on changes in environmental conditions. Compensation 
of these changes is likely to be less pronounced and the residual effect may capture a great 
part of the overall effect. Nevertheless, conceptually, it is still a residual effect and the two 
methods remain complements. 
An exception are environmental conditions for which it is useful to distinguish between 
expected benefits or costs and materialized benefits or costs, i.e. environmental risks such as 
the risk of flooding. In the case of risks, compensating variation in the housing market is 
based on expected risks. If the underlying probabilities are stable, the compensating variation 
is captured by region-specific effects. By the same token, all utility costs of insurance, 
protection measures and self-protection measures are reflected in the fixed-effects. In 
applications of the LSA with panel data, the effect of risks is accordingly identified on the 
basis of actual events, i.e. if the risk materializes. Therefore, the full utility losses or, more 
precisely, the full non-insurable and non-avertable losses can be recovered. In this situation, 
the hedonic method and the LSA are substitutes. 
5. Applications 
The LSA can be used to value a wide range of different public goods and bads, negative and 
positive externalities. Not claiming comprehensiveness, the LSA has been used to value 
climatic conditions (Frijters and van Praag 1998; Rehdanz and Maddison 2005; Becchetti et 
al. 2007; Brereton et al. 2008), airport noise nuisance (van Praag, Bernard M. S. and Baarsma 
2005), proximity to infrastructure (Brereton et al. 2008), urban regeneration schemes (Dolan 
and Metcalfe 2008), droughts (Carroll et al. 2009), floodings (Luechinger and Raschky 
                                                             
7 A complicating issue which is not considered here is that the standard hedonic theory describes the 
housing market equilibrium at a single point in time and is, thus, inherently cross-sectional. Panel 
analyses do not, in general, allow researchers to identify the MWTP (Kuminoff and Pope 2009). 
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2009), crime (Cohen 2008) and terrorism (Frey et al. 2009). However, as with the HM, the 
most widely studied environmental disamenity is air pollution. 
Air pollution was the object of interest already in the first application of the HM to the 
valuation of a public goods (Ridker and Henning 1967). By the mid 1990s, the number of 
studies allowed for a meta-analysis: Smith and Huang (1995) identified 86 MWTP estimates 
for a reduction in TSP in 37 different studies (the median MWTP was $46, the mean $228 in 
2007 U.S. dollars).8 Still today many methodological innovations are exemplified for the case 
of air pollution (Chay and Greenstone 2005; Bayer et al. 2009). This interest in air pollution 
is shared by the growing number of LSA studies. Up to date, at least seven studies focused on 
air pollution. This may be explained by the fact that air pollution belongs to the long-standing 
environmental concerns and was the focus of the earliest and most significant environmental 
regulations. While for some countries and air pollutants the situation improved, the situation 
in other countries, especially developing countries, and for other air pollutants deteriorates. 
Table 1 summarizes the seven LSA studies on air pollution. It reports the source and structure 
of the survey data used, the spatial resolution, the time period, the included pollutants and 
main control variables along with MWTP estimates (all estimates are in 2007 U.S. dollars). 
Most studies report the results for several specifications. The table summarizes the results 
from the baseline regression. If several specifications are presented as baseline regressions, 
the results of the most complete or comprehensive model are presented in the table. Similarly, 
if studies contained baseline regressions with the pollutants included individually and 
baseline regressions with the pollutants included jointly, the reported estimates are based on 
the latter regressions. Further, only statistically significant estimates are shown. Despite their 
shared focus on air pollution, the diversity in terms of considered pollutants, countries or 
regions and time periods as well as methodology, renders futile any attempt to synthesize 
their results into a summary statistics. The review of the studies rather serves to exemplify 
methodological aspects that pertain to the LSA literature more generally. 
The structure of the survey data is a first difference between the studies. While most studies 
use repeated cross-section data, two studies use cross-section data (Welsch 2002; MacKerron 
                                                             
8 Smith and Huang (1995) report their results in 1982-1984 U.S. dollars. The figures have been 
transformed to 2007 U.S. dollars using the CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U) of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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and Mourato 2009). It is clear that the inability to control for unobserved spatial 
heterogeneity that is correlated with air pollution makes cross-section estimates more prone 
to omitted variable bias and, most likely, more sensitive to changes in the specification. For 
example, in Welsch (2002), the effect of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) falls below conventional 
levels of significance if the number of scientists is excluded from the set of controls. Only 
one study uses individual panel data (Luechinger 2009b). While controlling for individual 
heterogeneity may be less important to correctly estimate the effect of pollution, it has 
substantial effects on the estimates of the effect of personal characteristics such as income 
(Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). This is important because the coefficient for income 
feeds in the calculation of the benefit estimates in monetary terms. 
Another difference across studies is the spatial resolution at which the survey data and the 
pollution data are merged. Most studies use country or country-year averages of pollution 
levels (Welsch 2002; 2006; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2007; Luechinger 2009a). To the extent 
that the country averages do not well represent respondents’ experienced degree of exposure 
to pollution where they live, the estimated effect of pollution on life satisfaction is attenuated 
towards zero.9 This problem can be addressed by using pollution data with a higher spatial 
resolution such as the county or ZIP-code level (Levinson 2009; Luechinger 2009b; 
MacKerron and Mourato 2009). The relevance of the attenuation bias is ultimately an 
empirical issue and will differ across settings. While for some pollutants and time periods the 
large cross-country and temporal variation may dwarf within country differences, for other 
settings the bias is likely to be more severe. 
Levinson (2009) extends the logic of the argument above to the issue of temporal resolution. 
While in the spatial case a higher resolution is generally desirable, this may not be true in the 
temporal case. The appropriate degree of temporal resolution depends on the channels 
through which pollution is likely to affect life satisfaction. On the one hand, if air pollution 
affects subjective well-being mainly through adverse health consequences, material damages 
and the like, measures capturing longer term exposure are relevant and, thus, longer term 
measures such as annual mean concentrations are more appropriate than short term measures. 
On the other hand, if aesthetics effects such as reduced visibility are the most important 
                                                             
9 In the Di Tella and MacCulloch’s (2007) study, this problem is aggravated by the fact that they use 
sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions instead of sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration as measure of air pollution. 
Since a large part of SOx pollution is transboundary, emission and pollution levels can differ greatly. 
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channel, short term measures may be better suited. Empirically, however, high peak 
concentrations and high annual mean concentrations will often go together and, hence, the 
choice of temporal resolution will be of minor importance. 
Even if repeated cross-section and panel data allow researchers to control for time-invariant 
spatial heterogeneity, estimates of pollution benefits are still prone to severe omitted variable 
biases: Local air pollution is likely to be highly correlated with unobserved local economic 
activity. In their HM analysis on the costs of TSP pollution, Chay and Greenstone (2005) 
provide evidence that supports this conjecture. Conventional MWTP estimates often have a 
perverse positive sign or are at best economically small and statistically insignificant. In 
contrast, MWTP estimates based on IV regressions range between $176 and $315 (2007 U.S. 
dollars).10 In order to address this simultaneity problem, two of the studies in Table 1 use 
exogenous changes in air pollution to identify the effect of air pollution on life satisfaction. 
Luechinger (2009b) exploits the natural experiment created by the mandated scrubber 
installation at German power plants together with wind directions dividing counties into 
treatment and control groups. Luechinger (2009a) instruments a country’s air pollution with 
the long-range transboundary air pollution caused by emissions in foreign countries. As can 
be seen from Table 1, MWTP estimates based on IV regressions are higher compared to the 
conventional estimates in both studies. 
With the LSA it is straightforward to go beyond estimating average effects. Several studies 
report differentiated effects for different subgroups of the population such as predicted risk 
groups, the elderly or environmentalists (Levinson 2009; Luechinger 2009b; a). On the one 
hand, these differentiated effects can serve as a robustness and plausibility check. On the 
other hand, differentiated effects can provide valuable information for policy makers and can 
help to understand the intensity of support for public good provision in the political process. 
6. Concluding remarks 
Based on our review of the LSA, concluding remarks in three directions are drawn. First, we 
derive some implications for research on subjective well-being and non-market valuation in 
                                                             
10 Chay and Greenstone (2005) report their results in 1982-1984 U.S. dollars. The figures have been 
transformed to 2007 U.S. dollars using the CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U) of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
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economics. Second, we raise the issue whether the effects of public goods on life satisfaction 
should be monetized. Finally, some proposals for future research are raised. 
The LSA and economic research on subjective well-being 
The LSA emphasizes public goods and externalities as determinants of individual welfare and 
thus complements our understanding of people’s preferences as derived from research on 
subjective well-being in economics. For a further successful application, we discussed six 
requirements subjective well-being measures should meet. These requirements though are 
important for empirical happiness research in general as they are (i) validity, (ii) 
inclusiveness, (iii) reference to presence, (iv) sufficiently high signal-to-noise ratio, (v) 
interpersonal (or intergroup) comparability, and (vi) availability. 
It was the aim of this review to convince the reader that subjective well-being data can be 
used to value public goods and, hence, that the LSA expands the economists’ toolbox in the 
area of non-market valuation. This same approach also allows researchers to test the 
underlying assumptions of the standard non-market valuation techniques. For example, the 
negative relationship between life satisfaction and air pollution indicates that air pollution is 
incompletely capitalized. Thus, the hedonic method understates the value of clean air. 
However, the problem of undercapitalization is likely to be more severe for externalities 
which are rapidly changing and which have important indirect effects than for stable and 
salient risks. 
Monetization? 
Does the LSA overshoot when monetizing the value of environmental conditions? The 
standard argument for monetization of externalities and public goods is that money is a 
convenient measuring rod that allows decision makers to compare various benefits and costs. 
However, it has long been recognized that WTP for a change in public good provision is an 
imperfect approximation for the effects of the change of overall welfare because of the wealth 
effects and the variable marginal utility of income or, in other words, because of the 
diminishing marginal utility of income. Suppose, for example, that a public project benefits 
the poor but hurts the rich. Such a project may increase aggregate welfare even though the 
sum of individual WTP is negative. Further, if public goods are monetized with the LSA, 
estimates on the effect of income on life satisfaction play a crucial role. Unfortunately, 
estimating the effect of income on life satisfaction is associated with serious problems, most 
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importantly endogeneity and omitted variable problems (Clark et al. 2008). This may well 
speak in favor of subjective well-being scores as an alternative non-monetary scale. 
However, several counterarguments speak in favor of monetization. First, many costs 
naturally accrue in monetary form, e.g. if compliance costs decrease firms’ profits and 
increase consumer prices. Converting monetary figures into life satisfaction scores is 
associated with exactly the same potential problems as the reverse operation. Second, in 
many situations, the LSA is complementary to the standard techniques and captures the 
residual shadow benefits only. In these situations, WTP estimates based on different methods 
have to be summedup in order to calculate the total shadow benefits of a public good. Third, 
for some potential uses of the LSA, welfare effects ultimately have to be expressed in 
monetary terms. An example are tort cases. Fourth, a large body of literature exists that 
contains a wealth of information on people’s WTP for public goods. For academic curiosity 
and for practical purposes, one might want to compare estimates based on the LSA to these 
WTP estimates. 
We recommend that studies using the LSA offer both: effect sizes in terms of subjective well-
being scores (togehter with exact information on the subjective well-being question, the mean 
response and the standard deviation in the sample) and in monetary terms. Effects in terms of 
subjective well-being can then later be combined with state of the art findings for the effects 
of monetary transfers on individual welfare. 
Future research 
We see two areas that warrant further research in the future. First, important insights will be 
gained by additional comparisons of the LSA with the standard methods. For example, 
subjective well-being data would allow us to test the crucial assumption of the travel cost 
approach that traveling to a recreational site provides no direct utility or disutility. Or, they 
could be used to quantify the non-pecuniary costs of defense and prevention behavior that is 
relevant for the defense expenditure approach. The second area for future research relates to 
improvements of the LSA. One major issue in this respect is a need for better estimates of the 
effect of income on life satisfaction. So far, estimates based on exogenous changes in income 
are rare. It has to be realized that many correlates in subjective well-being are actually choice 
variables and choices involve trade-offs. Thus, it should be no surprise if – at least at the 
margin – the raw effect of the choice variable on life satisfaction is small. Another issue 
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concerns the subjective well-being measures. We argued that existing measures of subjective 
well-being, particularly global self-reports of life satisfaction, are well suited for the purpose 
of valuing public goods. Yet there is still the concern that these measures and the estimates 
based thereon are systematically biased because of conceptual problems and contextual 
factors such as question order effects and the lack of intergroup comparability. The LSA 
would greatly benefit if these problems were taken seriously in the development of the next 
generation of subjective well-being measures. 
In sum, there is still room for improvement and many of the questions raised in this review 
remain unanswered. However, if we convinced the reader that the LSA can be potentially 
used to value public goods and that it is worthwhile to address the open issues, we have 
achieved our aim. 
  25 
References 
Adler MD, Posner EA. 2006. New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis. Cambridge, MA, 
and London, UK: Harvard University Press. 
Adler MD, Posner EA. 2008. Happiness Research and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Journal of 
Legal Studies 37: S253-S92. 
Arrow KJ, Solow RS, Leamer EE, Portney PR, Radner R, et al. 1993. Report of the NOAA-
Panel on Contingent Valuation. Federal Register 58: 4601-14. 
Arthaud-Day ML, Rode JC, Mooney CH, Near JP. 2005. The Subjective Well-Being 
Construct: A Test of Its Convergent, Discriminant, and Factorial Validity. Social 
Indicators Research 74: 445-76. 
Bayer P, Keohane NO, Timmins C. 2009. Migration and Hedonic Valuation: The Case of Air 
Quality. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58: 1-14. 
Becchetti L, Castriota S, Londono Bedoya DA. 2007. Climate, Happiness and the Kyoto 
Protocol: Someone Does Not Like It Hot. Departmental Working Paper No. 247, Tor 
Vergata University. 
Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. 2001. Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for 
Subjective Survey Data. American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings 91: 67-
72. 
Blanchflower DG, Oswald AJ. 2007. Hypertension and Happiness across Nations. Journal of 
Health Economics 27: 218-33. 
Brereton F, Clinch JP, Ferreira S. 2008. Happiness, Geography and the Environment. 
Ecological Economics 65: 386-96. 
Brookshire DS, Thayer MA, Tschirhart J, Schulze WD. 1985. A Test of the Expected Utility 
Model: Evidence from Earthquake Risks. Journal of Political Economy 93: 369-89. 
Camerer CF, Loewenstein G, Prelec D. 2005. Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can 
Inform Economics. Journal of Economic Literature 43: 9-64. 
Carroll N, Frijters P, Shields MA. 2009. Quantifying the Costs of Drought: New Evidence 
from Life Satisfaction Data. Journal of Population Economics 22: 445-61. 
Carson RT, Flores NE, Meade NF. 2001. Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 19: 173-210. 
Carson RT, Mitchell RC, Hanemann WM, Kopp RJ, Presser S, et al. 2003. Contingent 
Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 25: 257–86. 
Chay KY, Greenstone M. 2005. Does Air Quality Matter? Evidence from the Housing 
Market. Journal of Political Economy 113: 376-424. 
Clark AE, Frijters P, Shields MA. 2008. Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An 
Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles. Journal of Economic 
Literature 46: 95-144. 
Cohen MA. 2008. The Effect of Crime on Life Satisfaction. Journal of Legal Studies 37: 
S325-S52. 
Di Tella R, MacCulloch RJ. 2006. Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 20: 25-46. 
Di Tella R, MacCulloch RJ. 2007. Gross National Happiness as an Answer to the Easterlin 
Paradox? Journal of Development Economics 86: 22-42. 
  26 
Diamond PA, Hausman JA. 1994. Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better Than No 
Number? Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 45-64. 
Diener E. 1984. Subjective Well-Being. Psychological Bulletin 95: 542-75. 
Diener E, Suh EM, Lucas RE, Smith HL. 1999. Subjective Well-Being: Three Decades of 
Progress. Psychological Bulletin 125: 276-302. 
Dolan P, Kahneman D. 2008. Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for the 
Valuation of Health. Economic Journal 118: 215-34. 
Dolan P, Metcalfe R. 2008. Comparing Willingness-to-Pay and Subjective Well-Being in the 
Context of Non-Market Goods. CEP Discussion Paper No. 890, London School of 
Economics. 
Due JF, Friedlaender AF. 1973. Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector. 5th 
ed. Homewood: Irwin. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell A, Frijters P. 2004. How Important Is Methodology for the Estimates of 
the Determinants of Happiness? Economic Journal 114: 641-59. 
Freeman AM, III. 2003. The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory 
and Methods. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. 
Frey BS, Luechinger S, Stutzer A. 2009. The Life Satisfaction Approach to the Value of 
Public Goods: The Case of Terrorism. Public Choice 138: 317-45. 
Frey BS, Stutzer A. 2002a. Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions 
Affect Well-Being. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Frey BS, Stutzer A. 2002b. What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? Journal 
of Economic Literature 40: 402-35. 
Frey BS, Stutzer A. 2008. Stress That Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 110: 339-66. 
Frey BS, Stutzer A. 2010. Happiness and Public Choice. Public Choice, forthcoming. 
Frijters P, van Praag BMS. 1998. The Effects of Climate on Welfare and Well-Being in 
Russia. Climatic Change 39: 61-81. 
Gardner J, Oswald AJ. 2006. Do Divorcing Couples Become Happier by Breaking Up? 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 169: 319-36. 
Hanemann WM. 1994. Valuing the Environment through Contingent Valuation. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 8: 19-43. 
Kahneman D. 2000. Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment Based 
Approach. In Choices, Values, and Frames, eds. D Kahneman, A Tversky, 673–92. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman D, Diener E, Schwarz N, eds. 1999a. Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kahneman D, Knetsch JL. 1992. Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 22: 57-70. 
Kahneman D, Krueger AB, Schkade DA, Schwarz N, Stone AA. 2004. A Survey Method for 
Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method. Science 306: 
1776-80. 
Kahneman D, Ritov I, Schkade DA. 1999b. Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: 
An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19: 
203-35. 
Kahneman D, Sugden R. 2005. Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation. 
Environmental and Resource Economics 32: 161-81. 
  27 
Kahneman D, Thaler RH. 2006. Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 221-34. 
Kahneman D, Wakker PP, Sarin R. 1997. Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced 
Utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 375-405. 
Kelman M. 2005. Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare”. Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 33: 392-412. 
Kimball M, Willis R. 2006. Utility and Happiness. Mimeo, University of Michigan. 
Koivumaa-Honkanen H, Honkanen R, Viinamäki H, Heikkilä K, Kaprio J, et al. 2000. Self-
Reported Life Satisfaction and 20-Year Mortality in Healthy Finnish Adults. American 
Journal of Epidemiology 152: 983-91. 
Koivumaa-Honkanen H, Honkanen R, Viinamäki H, Heikkilä K, Kaprio J, et al. 2001. Life 
Satisfaction and Suicide: A 20-Year Follow-up Study. American Journal of Psychiatry 
158: 433-39. 
Kuminoff NV, Pope JC. 2009. Capitalization and Welfare Measurement in the Hedonic 
Model. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics Working Paper No. 2009-
01, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
Larsen RJ, Frederickson BL. 1999. Measurement Issues in Emotion Research. In Well-Being: 
The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, eds. D Kahneman, E Diener, N Schwarz, 61-
84. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Layard R. 2005. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. New York, NY: Penguin. 
Levinson A. 2009. Valuing Air Quality Using Happiness Data. Mimeo, Georgetown 
University. 
Loewenstein G, Schkade DA. 1999. Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings. In 
Well-Being: The Foundation of Hedonic Psychology, eds. D Kahneman, E Diener, N 
Schwarz, 85-105. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Luechinger S. 2009a. Life Satisfaction and Transboundary Air Pollution. Economics Letters, 
forthcoming. 
Luechinger S. 2009b. Valuing Air Quality Using the Life Satisfaction Approach. Economic 
Journal 119: 482-515. 
Luechinger S, Raschky P. 2009. Valuing Flood Disasters Using the Life Satisfaction 
Approach. Journal of Public Economics 93: 620-33. 
MacKerron G, Mourato S. 2009. Life Satisfaction and Air Quality in London. Ecological 
Economics 68: 1441-53. 
McCluskey JJ, Rausser GC. 2001. Estimation of Perceived Risk and Its Effect on Property 
Values. Land Economics 77: 42-55. 
Palmquist RB, Smith VK. 2002. The Use of Hedonic Property Value Techniques for Policy 
and Litigation. In The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource 
Economics 2002/2003, eds. T Tietenberg, H Folmer, 115-64. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
Pope JC. 2008a. Buyer Information and the Hedonic: The Impact of a Seller Disclosure on 
the Implicit Price for Airport Noise. Journal of Urban Economics 63: 498-516. 
Pope JC. 2008b. Do Seller Disclosures Affect Property Values?  Buyer Information and the 
Hedonic Model. Land Economics 84: 551-72. 
Portney PR. 1994. The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 8: 3-17. 
Rehdanz K, Maddison D. 2005. Climate and Happiness. Ecological Economics 52: 111-25. 
  28 
Ridker RG, Henning JA. 1967. The Determinants of Residential Property Values with 
Special Reference to Air Pollution. Review of Economics and Statistics 49: 246-57. 
Roback J. 1982. Wages, Rents, and the Quality of Life. Journal of Political Economy 90: 
1257-78. 
Robbins LC. 1938. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment. Economic Journal 48: 
635-41. 
Rosen S. 1974. Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition. Journal of Political Economy 82: 34-55. 
Sandvik E, Diener E, Seidlitz L. 1993. Subjective Well-Being: The Convergence and 
Stability of Self-Report and Non-Self-Report Measures. Journal of Personality 61: 317-
42. 
Schwarz N, Strack F. 1991. Evaluating One’s Life: A Judgment Model of Subjective Well-
Being. In Subjective Well-Being: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, eds. F Strack, M 
Argyle, N Schwarz, 27-47. Oxford, UK, et al.: Pergamon Press. 
Schwarz N, Strack F. 1999. Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes and 
Their Methodological Implications. In Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology, eds. D Kahneman, E Diener, N Schwarz, 61-84. New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation. 
Smith VK, Huang J-C. 1995. Can Markets Value Air Quality? A Meta-Analysis of Hedonic 
Property Value Models. Journal of Political Economy 103: 209-27. 
Smith VK, Osborne LL. 1996. Do Contingent Valuation Estimates Pass A "Scope" Test? A 
Meta-Analysis. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 31: 287-301. 
Stone AA, Shiffman SS, DeVries MW. 1999. Ecological Momentary Assessment. In Well-
Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, eds. D Kahneman, E Diener, N 
Schwarz, 26-39. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Strack F, Martin LL, Schwarz N. 1988. Priming and Communication: Social Determinants of 
Information Use in Judgments of Life Satisfaction. European Journal of Social 
Psychology 18: 429-42. 
Stutzer A, Frey BS. 2006. Does Marriage Make People Happy, or Do Happy People Get 
Married? Journal of Socio-Economics 35(2): 326-47. 
Sumner LW. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Troy A, Romm J. 2004. Assessing the Price Effects of Flood Hazard Disclosure under the 
California Natural Hazard Disclosure Law (AB 1195). Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 47: 137-62. 
Urry HL, Nitschke JB, Dolski I, Jackson DC, Dalton KM, et al. 2004. Making a Life Worth 
Living: Neural Correlates of Well-Being. Psychological Science 15: 367-72. 
van Praag BMS, Baarsma BE. 2005. Using Happiness Surveys to Value Intangibles: The 
Case of Airport Noise. Economic Journal 115: 224-46. 
van Praag BMS, Ferrer-i-Carbonell A. 2008. Happiness Quantified - a Satisfaction Calculus 
Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Welsch H. 2002. Preferences over Prosperity and Pollution: Environmental Valuation Based 
on Happiness Surveys. Kyklos 55: 473-94. 
Welsch H. 2006. Environment and Happiness: Valuation of Air Pollution Using Life 
Satisfaction Data. Ecological Economics 58: 801-13. 
 
  29 
Table 1. Summary of LSA studies valuing air quality 
Study Data, structure, spatial 
resolution and period 
Air pollution 
indicators 
Controls MWTP 
Welsch 2002 Various sources, cross-
section, 54 countries 
(dependent variable is 
country average of 
happiness), early and 
mid 1990s 
TSP, SO2 and 
NO2 
Water pollution and 
other economic and 
societal variables 
NO2:  $113 
Welsch 2006  Eurobarometer, re-
peated cross-section, 10 
European countries 
(dependent variable is 
country-year average of 
life satisfaction), 1990-
1997 
TSP, NO2 and 
Pb 
GNP per capita as well 
as country and year 
effects 
Pb: $184 
Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2007 
Eurobarometer and 
GSS, repeated cross-
section, 12 OECD 
countries, 1975-1997 
SOx emissions 
per capita 
Personal characteristics, 
life expectancy, crime 
rate and other economic 
and societal variables 
as well as country and 
year effects 
SOx:  $171 
Levinson 2008 GSS, repeated cross-
section, approx. 300 US 
counties, 1973-1996 
(with gaps) 
PM10; in sep-
arate regres-
sions also SO2 
and CO 
Personal characteristics, 
temperature and preci-
pitation, region, year 
and month effects 
PM10: $896 
Luechinger 2009a Eurobarometer, re-
peated cross-section, 13 
European countries, 
1979-1994 
SO2, conven-
tional and IV-
estimates 
Personal characteristics, 
macro-economic va-
riables as well as coun-
try and time effects 
SO2: $157 
SO2, IV: $324 
Luechinger 2009b GSOEP, individual 
level panel, approx. 450 
German counties, 1985-
2003 
SO2, conven-
tional and IV-
estimates 
Personal characteristics, 
county characteristics, 
county, state specific 
time trends as well as 
time and individual 
effects 
SO2:  $200 
SO2, IV: $340 
MacKerron and 
Mourato 2009 
Own web survey for 
London, cross-section, 
ZIP-codes of 400 res-
pondents, 2007 
NO2 Personal characteristics, 
attitudes and percep-
tions, distance from 
major road and city 
centre 
NO2:  $8,296 
General notes: (1) Most studies present the results of different specifications. The table summarizes the results from the 
baseline regression. If several specifications are presented as baseline regressions, the results of the most complete or 
comprehensive model are presented in the table. (2) The results reported in the studies have been transformed to 2007 U.S. 
dollars with the CPI for all urban consumers (CPI-U) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and annual exchange rates where 
necessary. (3) MWTP estimates refer to a reduction of 1 µg/m3 of the respective pollutant. Exceptions are the MWTP 
estimates for lead (Pb) and sulfur oxide (SOx) emissions. For Pb, the MWTP refers to a reduction of 0.01 µg/m3 since Pb 
concentrations are around 100 times lower compared to the concentrations of other pollutants. For SOx emissions MWTP 
refers to a reduction of 1 kg per capita. 
 
